Independence Institute

“Law is hailed as the instrument of freedom because without law, there would be anarchy, and we would eventually come under the thumb of whoever gets power. Too much law, we are learning, can have a comparable effect: Millions of tiny legal cubicles give humans virtually no leeway. Unlike any legal system we ever admired, it tells us what to do and exactly how to do it.”

This paper explains the handling of domestic violence in Colorado’s civil courts, with the emphasis on the law of restraining orders. The paper also includes discussions of non-domestic violence restraining orders; how the criminal legal system deals with domestic violence; and, finally, policy implications and recommendations.

· Colorado has a large number of overlapping laws about restraining orders issued by civil courts.

· A person can be forced to leave his/her home simply because of allegations about the potential of future emotional (not physical) abuse.

· Much of the testimony, political pressure and rational supporting Colorado’s extensive domestic violence legislation is based on misinformation propounded by the very same special interests that now find themselves on the receiving end of business generated by that legislation.

· Much of Colorado law is based on the “research” of Denver psychologist Lenore Walker. Dr. Walker was exposed as a fraud for perpetrating the 1994 Super Bowl hoax, in which she claimed that the Super Bowl was the number one day for domestic violence in the U.S. The Washington Post investigated, and found that Dr. Walker had no evidence to support the claim.

· Dr. Walker and her cohorts condemn marriage as the supposed source of domestic violence, even though domestic violence is six times more likely outside a marriage than inside.

This paper highlights three key problems with Colorado’s restraining order system:

· Some restraining order laws do not carefully distinguish physical assaults from emotional harm.

· Colorado law rigidly forces anyone with a “domestic violence” label into a therapeutic programs of the type supported by Dr. Walker--regardless of whether therapy is appropriate in the individual case.

· Give divorce courts the power to modify or end restraining orders that the parties obtained from other courts.

· Allow each Judicial District to decide whether to continue to allow County and Municipal Courts to issue restraining orders--or whether to consolidate all restraining order cases in District Courts.

· Modify Colorado Revised Statutes 14-4-102, 14-10-108, and19-3-316 to distinguish between the fuzzy concept of “emotional harm” and physical harm/danger.

· Forbid courts to force a person out of his/her home simply because of allegations of emotional abuse--if the person was not even given a chance to attend the hearing where the emotional abuse allegations were made.

· Change CRS 18-6-802, which sets up a board to certify therapy programs for domestic violence offenders. Three members (instead of just one member) of the eight-member board should come from the community at large--so as the reduce the chance that certain therapeutic providers will have a stacked board to steer business their way.

· The Governor should appoint a task force to assess extensive therapeutic structures currently mandated by Colorado law.

Civil personal restraining orders are the means by which one person may mobilize the physical and moral power of the state against another person. Restraining orders are often obtained ex parte; that is, the person against whom the restraining order is issued is not in court, and not even aware of the court proceeding. Then, once the order is issued, the defendant is served notice, and then required to appear in court to show cause why the restraining order should not be made permanent.

Colorado has many different legal mechanisms for obtaining restraining orders, as this Paper will now detail.

Rule 365 is a county court rule and is designed for the generic restraint of assaults and threats between people. The law also covers the issuance of restraining orders for breach of restrictive covenants on residential real property.^[i] Rule 365 provides that a person who has been “attacked, beaten, molested, or threatened” with death or serious bodily injury^[ii] can file a verified complaint in County Court to that effect and obtain a restraining order.

In its drafting and its practice Rule 365 is user friendly. It is concise and straightforward-- about 300 words dealing with personal restraining orders and 250 words dealing with restrictive covenants. A reasonably literate person does not need an attorney. He can go up to the county court clerk’s counter, explain briefly why he is there and be given the appropriate complaint form to fill out. Typically hearings on such restraining orders are held at the same time every workday in county court and most complaining parties can fill in the blanks on the complaint form, be heard by a judge or magistrate, and obtain a restraining order (which must then be served on the defendant) in one stop.

This convenience, and layman-oriented practice is only right. We are, after all, dealing with physical assaults or threats of physical assaults and the amount of process between a potentially dangerous situation and the staying hand of the restraining order should be, and is, minimized.

Rule 365 proceedings do not, however, comprise the majority of restraining order cases. For example, in Denver County Court in September 1998, there were 237 complaints for restraining orders filed, but only 67 were under Rule 365.^[iii] The critical distinction between Rule 365 actions and the vast majority of the balance of the cases, domestics, discussed infra, is that Rule 365 does not require a current or past “intimate relationship”^[iv] between the complaining party and the defendant.

A typical Rule 365 case involves disputing neighbors and the like. Rule 365 and domestic cases are typically heard at the same time in county court. Let us now turn to the legal procedures for restraining orders in domestic cases.

The lion’s share of county court civil restraining orders are domestic, and of those the most used statute is Domestic Abuse, 14-4-101-105 CRS, (hereinafter also referred to as “Article 4”). The Domestic Abuse law was enacted in 1982 and has been amended in 1989, 1981, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998. It is about three thousand words long. It authorizes municipal (if authorized by the governing body), county, and district courts to issue temporary and permanent restraining orders.

Article 4 operates much as Rule 365 but it is extensively tailored for domestic situations: husband/wife, boyfriend/girlfriend, and gay/lesbian partners.

Article 4 specifically authorizes courts to issue restraining orders “whether or not such relief could be obtained in a domestic relations action in district court.”^[v] It is clear why the legislature saw fit to do this: access to county or municipal court can be easier, and speedier, than filing for the order during a pending divorce in district court.

Still, because of this double access, multiple Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO’s) can and do pile up in particularly nasty divorces. While a divorce is going on in district court, the spouses may go to country court to get TRO’s against each other. It can be hard for counsel and parties to keep track of what’s happening. Also, because of this provision, substantial game playing is made more possible. If a party does not like results obtained in front of the district court judge he or she can try again in county court. Recently the legislature has added disclosure requirements of prior restraining orders both in Article 4 and in divorce filings.^[vi] This palliative, however, does not come close solving the problem of multiple TRO’s.

In contrast to Rule 365, Article 4 attempts to address the complexities existing in the domestic context which are not present in non-domestic situations. Regarding children, Article 4 discusses temporary custody (soon to be parenting rights and responsibilities), which may include parenting time, supervised or unsupervised.^[[vii]] It also deals with the procedure for the defendant returning to shared residence for his belongings in the presence of a police officer.^[[viii]]

Much as with Rule 365, Article 4 requires service of the complaint and restraining order on the defendant with a citation to appear in court to show cause why the order should not be made permanent.^[ix] However, Article 4 also attempts to coordinate with a pending divorce by allowing the district court in which the divorce is filed, if that is where the Article 4 TRO is obtained, to dispense with a show cause date and to review the order at a standard temporary orders hearing.^[x] (This hearing is discussing below.)

As with all other domestic violence restraining orders, Article 4 requires that the order be issued on a standardized form.^[xi]

The most salient shortcoming of Article 4 is the confusing way it handles the issue of whether defendants, mostly husbands, may be kicked out of the family home, when there are no physical threats or abuse. Article 4 defines “Domestic Abuse” as “any act or threatened act of violence”^[xii]—but then goes on to say: “A temporary or permanent restraining order to prevent domestic abuse may include:...(b) Excluding a party from the family home upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result...” (emphasis added).^[xiii]

In other words, a spouse may be ordered to vacate the home simply because of allegations that he/she might cause emotional harm.

Emotional harm? Does Article 4 require some sort of physical threats or abuse in order to make such a showing? It could be read that way. But it also could be read that you can kick hubby out simply because it would be awkward for him to remain. Which, by the way, is not such a bad thing. Divorces are tough enough. When one is pending it might very well be best that the husband be required to vacate the premises even when there is no domestic violence.

But can the same be said for non-formalized relationships, with or without children? Also, the statute, under the non-violent-but-awkward circumstances, seems to pressure the complainant to lie; to fabricate some sort of physical abuse in order to bootstrap “emotional harm”, or to demonize the defendant so that the “emotional harm” could be more palpable.

C. 13-14-101 et seq. (HB 99-1204): Consolidation (and some reform) in County Courthouses

The problem of fuzzing the concept of physical danger and abuse with emotional harm in the context of civil domestic restraining orders issued out of County Courts was addressed in the 1999 legislature by passage of HB 1204. The bill was sponsored by Representative Mark Paschall and Senators Norma Anderson and Jim Congrove, and is effective July 1, 1999 as C.R.S. 13-14-101, 102.

On a procedural level HB 1204 consolidates many of the procedures and forms associated with domestic restraining orders issued out of County Courts.

On a substantive level HB 1204 defines “domestic abuse” using exclusively concepts of physical violence or the threat of physical violence. It does not include “emotional harm” as part of the definition. Further—and this is where it breaks with decades of legislative blurring of physical violence with emotional harm—it specifically provides that a “temporary civil restraining order may be issued,” upon a finding that “imminent danger exists to the life or health of one or more persons...” HB 1204 makes no mention of any other criteria.

Technically, HB 1204 does not affect the operation of Article 4 (discussed in the previous section) in District Courts. Also (and this is rather hyper technical, but still bears mentioning), HB 1204 may arguably be ignored by a County Court Judge who still desires to issue restraining orders on a finding of “emotional harm” under the grant of jurisdiction set out in Article 4, which HB 1204 does not address.

However, HB 1204 does make issuance of “emotional harm” orders less likely by, effectively, cornering the market on forms. It amends 13-1-136 so that all the standardized forms available in County Court conform to HB 1204, and thus, most likely, will eliminate all reference to emotional harm as acceptable grounds for issuing a restraining order out of County Court.

The next major domestic violence restraining order statute, CRS 14-10-108 (hereinafter “Temporary Orders”), provides that the court may “exclude a party from the family home or from the home of the other party upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result.”

The Temporary Orders statute addresses much more than restraining domestic violence. It lies at the center of the divorce process set out in the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act.^[xiv] It is a stopgap by which the parties come before the court for temporary (pending permanent orders) resolution of such issues as child support, maintenance, parenting “rights and responsibilities,” and other matters. Prominent amongst those other matters are temporary orders restraining harassment and/or abuse.

The Temporary Orders law takes a very flexible and pragmatic approach to obtaining domestic abuse restraining orders. A party can obtain one in a regularly scheduled Temporary Orders hearing^[xv] in which other issues are addressed as well or, if the situation is dire, she can obtain a restraining order, ex parte, without notice upon showing of the potential of “irreparable injury.”^[xvi]

There is one glaring exception to the general flexibility of 14-10-108 and that concerns the ability of a District Court, presiding over a divorce, to modify prior restraining orders. Right now 14-4-102 (12) allows the District Court to modify or terminate domestic abuse orders only as they pertain to access to the home and temporary custody. Technically the District Court cannot modify a prior order so as to allow the parties to communicate with each other. This can be very problematic in a divorce when communication between the parties is necessary for the exchange of information and is precluded by the domestic abuse order. Many divorces, especially of working class people, are made infinitely more difficult because of this.

Generally, in contrast to Article 4 in which the bulk of complaining parties are pro-se and filing in county court, restraining orders arising out the Temporary Orders statute are more lawyer intensive. They tend to be byproducts of a litigated divorce.

In filing and serving a summons and petition for divorce the initiating party activates an automatic restraining order prohibiting both parties from disposing of marital assets (except in the regular course of business), harassing each other, and removing any children from the state.^[xvii]

The above discussion by no means exhausts the subject of personal restraint in Colorado. There is a specific statute authorizing restraining orders to prevent emotional abuse of the elderly^[xviii] which accounts for about 2.5% of county court restraining orders issued^[xix]; mandatory (automatic) restraining orders to prevent harassment of witnesses or victims in criminal and juvenile/criminal cases^[xx]; a restraining order to protect children from sexual offenses in the context of a dependency and neglect action^[xxi];and a restraining order, patterned after the Temporary Orders discussed above, which can issue from a paternity/custody action where there is no marriage.^[xxii]

The business end of all the above restraining orders is a criminal statute, 18-6-803.5, which makes a violation of any of the above restraining orders a crime. Violation of a restraining order is a class two misdemeanor with a minimum sentence of three months imprisonment or two hundred and fifty dollar fine or both.

If the defendant has previously been convicted of violating a restraining order, the subsequent violation escalates to a class one misdemeanor where the minimum sentence is six months imprisonment or five hundred dollar fine, or both.^[xxiii]

Prior to the enactment of this statute in 1991 there were no criminal sanctions for violation of civil restraining orders. Back then the only remedy for violation of a restraining order was contempt, which required not only notice but service of process on the defendant. Since 1991 the consequences of violating an order can be swift: immediate incarceration.

There is no self-standing “crime” of domestic violence. There is the crime of violating civil and criminal restraining orders. The term of “domestic violence” is basically added to existing crimes: assault, battery, trespass, destruction of property, where the “underlying factual basis” includes an act of domestic violence. The key to that underlying factual basis is the relationship between the perpetrator and victim. If that relationship “is or has been” “intimate” then the label of domestic violence applies.^[xxiv] The upshot is that much of the legislation in the domestic violence area deals with labeling, and nothing more.

Why is labeling so important when it does not trigger another crime, or for that matter increase the punishment for a given crime? It is important because once the domestic violence label attaches the defendant “shall be ordered to complete a treatment program which is certified in accordance with section 18-6-802. If an intake evaluation conducted by a certified treatment program provider discloses that sentencing to a treatment program would be inappropriate, the person shall be referred back to the court for alternative disposition.”^[xxv]

In short, the labeling transforms the criminal courts into an instrument of compulsory therapy. An industry has been created and a powerful lobbying force nurtured.

Of the approximately 1,000 new criminal cases handled by the Denver City Attorney’s office per month, about 50% have the domestic violence label attached. Of those 500 or so cases, about 100 were violation of restraining order cases. Of that number 2/3rds were violation of civil domestic restraining orders and 1/3 were violation of criminal restraining orders. By far the vast majority of domestic violence “action” in the criminal courts does not arise from violation of restraining orders, civil or criminal, but rather, are cases initiated by a criminal complaint.^[xxvi] This pattern holds true for the more serious crimes in Denver handled by the Denver District Attorney’s office.^[xxvii]

Not all the criminal defendants subjected to mandatory therapy or evaluation are male. Over 20% of the criminal defendants in domestic violence cases are women.^[xxviii] This fact flies in the face of much of the orthodoxy on which the statutory edifice of Colorado’s domestic violence legislation is based.

Domestic abuse happens. Our culture covered it up in the past, not anymore. That is to the good. Also to the good is the fact that the law takes great pains to identify criminal acts which occur in the domestic context. An assault or trespass or harassment by one neighbor against another is, in reality, quite a different thing than an assault or trespass or harassment by husband or boyfriend against a wife or girlfriend. The distinction is valid and the state should continue to make it.

What is not so evident is the benefit of the massive interposition of therapeutic coercion in a significant portion of our criminal justice system. What is not so evident is the extent to which such therapeutic coercion is effective in reducing the incidence of domestic violence in our culture. Further, what has been absent in the discussion and legislation in the area of domestic violence is a balancing of the benefits of now extensive state intervention, both through criminal and civil process, and the detriment of the those very processes.

That the above issues have not been addressed either in legislation, or for that matter studies commissioned by any of the three branches of government, should not surprise. Much of the testimony, political pressure, and rationales supporting Colorado’s extensive domestic violence legislation is based on misinformation propounded by the very same special interests that are the beneficiaries of business generated by that legislation. Following is a discussion of some of those fictions and those who have propounded them.

Any discussion of myth making in the domestic violence area would be incomplete without mention of the impact of Lenore Walker, Colorado resident and psychologist. Dr. Walker’s influence on domestic violence legislation reaches far beyond Colorado’s borders. She is a nationally recognized figure in the area, due in large part to her book The Battered Woman, first published in 1979. Moreover, this particular prophet has been extensively honored in her own land. She has testified frequently at committee hearings dealing with Colorado’s domestic violence laws.^[xxix]

The Battered Woman has been an immensely influential work. Many professional articles in the area of divorce law cite Dr. Walker chapter and verse.^[xxx] Dr. Walker should be acknowledged, and, up to a point, commended for the very substantial role she has played in turning the ship of state away from massive and routine denial of domestic violence to one of forthright recognition and necessary intervention.

But although the ends (putting domestic violence on the map of law enforcement intervention) have been legitimate, the means have often ranged from unsupported assertion to out and out lies.

First, The Battered Woman is less a scholarly work backed up by research than a political tract drawing on substantial anecdotal experiences of Walker’s patients and on her own social/political perspective.^[xxxi]

Secondly Dr. Walker has made outrageously false statements about factual issues surrounding domestic violence. She was central in the now infamous “Super Bowl Hoax” of 1994 when on January 28 of that year, one day after a coalition of women’s groups had called a press conference denouncing the Super Bowl as “the biggest day of the year for violence against women,” Dr. Walker appeared on Good Morning America “claiming to have compiled a ten-year record showing a sharp increase in violent incidents against women on Super Bowl Sundays.”^[xxxii]

Other feminists joined in hue and cry until a lone journalist, Ken Ringle of the Washington Post, started to check the facts. Ringle quickly found that the studies cited at the news conferences said nothing of the sort.^[xxxiii] Further, when Walker was asked to detail the findings she referenced on the Good Morning America Show she said they were no longer available.

Another canard promoted by Dr. Walker, and embraced by feminist writers across the country, is the “rule of thumb” supposed to be embedded in the common law.^[xxxiv] This rule allegedly gave statutory authority for husbands to beat their wives in countless Anglo-American jurisdictions with a stick no thicker than their thumb. The only trouble is no such laws existed on the books. According to Christina Hoff Sommers:

The Super Bowl Hoax and “Rule of Thumb” legend are but the tip of the iceberg of nonexistent factoids that have gone into the legislative mix of our domestic violence laws.

For purposes of examining the depth of misinformation in this area let us consider the following quote which appeared in the October 1994 issue of the Colorado Lawyer: “Domestic violence is the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States, more common than auto accidents, muggings and rapes combined.”^[xxxvi] The statement was noted and the note cited several sources, chief of which were two papers by Stark and Flitcraft. The actual research behind this “fact” is based on a survey of one emergency room. It is a whopper. The facts, as revealed in a Justice Department study, are that all violence is responsible for about 3% of women’s injury-related visits to emergency rooms, and domestic violence for about 1%. By comparison, CDC numbers show that more than twice as many women visit emergency rooms due to being injured by an animal (459,000 a year) than by a male partner.^[xxxvii]

Finally, perhaps the most destructive impact Dr. Walker and other feminist true believers have had on domestic violence policy has less to do with out and whoppers than with their unrelenting, and unsupported, condemnation of the institution marriage as the seedbed of domestic violence.^[xxxviii]

As it turns out, marriage, while certainly not immune from domestic violence, is probably the strongest antidote to a woman being beaten by a man in an intimate relationship. Violence is approximately six times more likely to occur outside the institution of marriage than within.^[xxxix]

Because it is very easy to get a domestic restraining order there is much game playing that goes on. To a certain extent this is inevitable because as a society we have made the choice, appropriately this writer thinks, to strike a balance in favor of accessibility of the restraining order process, even in the face of abuses. But it is important to acknowledge, and when possible, minimize those abuses.

One of those abuses is that often pro se complainants can and do use retraining orders to, in effect, make de facto custody determinations that either stand permanently or have a telling impact throughout subsequent litigation.^[xl]

Another problem is the inherent confusion surrounding the question of whether or not “emotional harm” is sufficient to issue an order. This confusion, by the way, may be traced directly to the philosophy of many of the proponents of these laws, specifically Dr. Lenore Walker, whose work argues that there is a seamless continuum between physical and emotional abuse.^[xli] While HB 1204 has gone a long way in clarifying the need for “imminent danger” before a restraining order is issued by County Courts, there still is much to do at the District Court level, both in regards to 14-4-104 (Domestic Violence) and 14-10-108 (Temporary Orders).

By far, however, the most disturbing problem surrounding the edifice of domestic violence laws and enforcement is the incestuous relationship between the therapeutic providers who are now hardwired into the process and existing assessment mechanisms. A large chunk of our criminal justice system now force-feeds therapy (or at least evaluation) to defendants. Just how effective is all this therapy? Would incarceration be more effective? Are defendants being railroaded?

Laws that have their genesis in pseudo social science, hysteria and nonexistent facts are not necessarily bad. But they bear watching. Following are some recommendations:

· Modify 14-10-108 to give broad discretionary powers in the District Court sitting in a divorce to terminate or modify prior domestic abuse restraining orders entered in any jurisdiction.

· Modify 14-4-102 to authorize the Judicial Districts (District Courts) to decide for themselves whether or not they want domestic restraining orders to issue out of County and Municipal Courts or consolidate them in District Court. Each judicial district should do its own balancing between the values of accessibility and coherence.

· Modify 14-4-102, 14-10-108, 19-3-316 to distinguish between the rather fuzzy concept of “emotional harm” and physical harm/danger. If a party wants a spouse or partner out of the house because things are getting awkward the order should issue only after a noticed hearing where both parties can have a chance to say their piece. No ex parte “emotional harm” ejections.

· Currently 18-6-802 sets up a highly questionable assessment structure to “certify and monitor treatment programs for persons convicted of the crime of domestic violence.” A local board consisting of “...eight members: Two members from the victim services field; one member from law enforcement; one member from a prosecutor’s office; one member from the probation department; one member from the community at large; one member from the mental health profession; and one member from the state department of human services or county department of social services” is charged with these duties. Even though the statute provides that no member of the board have “pecuniary interest” in the treatment program being monitored, there is a clear conflict of interest in putting any member of the “victim services field” in a monitoring position. The statute should be changed to provide for three members (not one) of the community at large be appointed to the board and no one from “the victim services field.”

· On a statewide basis the Governor should appoint a task force to assess the general impact of the extensive therapeutic structures hardwired into our criminal justice/domestic violence system. Are innocent defendants being thrown into the maw? Are hardened perpetrators who should be incarcerated being let off to do more damage? Are there ways to protect women more effectively while at the same time minimize state intervention into the family? (Remember that a significant percentage of domestic violence arrests are of women in codefendant cases.) These questions need to be asked and pursued.

INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE is a nonprofit, nonpartisan Colorado think tank. It is governed by a statewide board of trustees and holds a 501(c)(3) tax exemption from the IRS. Its public policy focuses on economic growth, education reform, local government effectiveness, and constitutional rights.

ED LEDERMAN is a Senior Fellow at the Independence Institute. He is also a Denver attorney specializing in domestic cases. His office is located at 243 E. 19th Ave., Suite 315, Denver, CO 80203-1117. He may be contacted at 303-832-7797; or ed.lederman@cwixmail.com. He is the author of many Issue Papers and op-eds on education policy, law, and other topics for the Independence Institute.

PERMISSION TO REPRINT this paper in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given to the Independence Institute.

Additional Independence Institute resources on judicial reform, criminal justice and other subjects, can be found at the Independence Institute website: http://i2i.org.

[1] Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter CRCP) 365 (c).

[2] CRCP 365 (b)(1).

[3] Denver County Court Civil Division New Filing Statistics by Date Range. 365’s 67; Elderly 6; Domestics 161, for month of September 1998.

[4] Colorado Revised Statutes (hereinafter omitted) 14-4-101 (3).

[5] 14-4-102 (1).

[6] 14-4-102 (15), 14-10-107.8.

[7] 14-4-102 (2) (d).

[8] 14-4-102 (7.5).

[9] 14-4-102 (5).

[10] Ibid.

[11] NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: WARNING: A KNOWING VIOLATION OF A RESTRAINING ORDER IS A CRIME UNDER SECTION 18-6-803.5 CRS A VIOLATION MAY SUBJECT YOU TO FINES UP TO $5,000 AND UP TO EIGHTEEN MONTHS IN JAIL. A VIOLATION WILL ALSO CONSTITUTE A CONTEMPT OF COURT. YOU MAY BE ARRESTED WITHOUT NOTICE IF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE KNOWINGLY VIOLATED THIS ORDER. IF YOU VIOLATE THIS ORDER THINKING THAT THE OTHER PARTY OR A CHILD NAMED IN THIS ORDER HAS GIVEN YOU PERMISSION TO DO SO, YOU ARE WRONG, AND CAN BE ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED. THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER CANNOT BE CHANGED BY AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY OR CHILD(REN). ONLY THE COURT CAN CHANGE THIS ORDER.

NOTICE OF HEARING AND CITATION:THIS ORDER IS IN EFFECT UNTIL______________________________(DATE), AT _____________________(TIME).

YOU, THE DEFENDANT, ARE DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COURT ON THAT DATE TO SHOW CAUSE, IF ANY EXISTS, WHY THIS TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER SHOULD NOT BE MADE PERMANENT. YOU ARE FURTHER ADVISED THAT IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT THE TIME AND PLACE REQUIRED BY THIS CITATION, A BENCH WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST.

IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT THE PERMANENT ORDERS HEARING, YOU WILL BE IN DEFAULT, AND A PERMANENT RESTRAINING ORDER SHALL ISSUE WITH THE SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, OR A PERMANENT RESTRAINING ORDER MAY BE ISSUED WITH DIFFERENT TERMS AND CONDITIONS. YOU ARE NOTIFIED THAT THE PERMANENT RESTRAINING ORDER SHALL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT, EXCEPT THAT THE TEMPORARY CARE AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILDREN ORDERED BY THIS COURT WILL END IN 120 DAYS.

NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS YOU SHALL USE EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS RESTRAINING ORDER. YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS ORDER OR HAS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS ORDER. YOU SHALL ENFORCE THIS ORDER EVEN IF THERE IS NO RECORD OF IT IN THE RESTRAINING ORDER CENTRAL REGISTRY. YOU SHALL TAKE THE RESTRAINED PERSON TO THE NEAREST JAIL OR DETENTION FACILITY UTILIZED BY YOUR AGENCY. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO PROTECT THE ALLEGED VICTIM AND THE ALLEGED VICTIM’S CHILDREN TO PREVENT FURTHER VIOLENCE. YOU MAY TRANSPORT, OR ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION FOR, THE ALLEGED VICTIM AND/OR THE ALLEGED VICTIM’S CHILDREN TO SHELTER. IF THE ORDER HAS NOT BEEN PERSONALLY SERVED ON THE DEFENDANT, THE PURSUANT TO SECTION 14-4-102, CRS , THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER RESPONDING TO THE SCENE OF AN ALLEGED VIOLATION SHALL SERVE A COPY OF THE ORDER ON THE DEFENDANT AT THAT TIME.

14-4-101 (2).

[xii] 14-4-102 (2) (b).

[xiii] 14-4-102 (2) (b).

[xiv] 14-10-101 through 14-10-131.5.

[xv] 14-10-108 (2).

[16] 14-10-108(2).

[xvii] 14-10-107.

[xviii] 13-6-107.

[xix] See note 3 supra.

[xx] 18-1-1001, 19-2-707 respectively.

[xxi] 19-3-316.

[xxii] 19-4-111, specifically references 14-10-108.

[xxiii] 18-6-803.5, 18-1-106.

[xxiv] 18-6-800.3 (1).

[xxv] 18-6-801.

[xxvi] Oct. 8, 1998 telephone conversation with John Poley, Deputy City Attorney.

[xxvii] Per Oct. 8, 1998 telephone conversation with Linda Ferry of the Denver District Attorney’s office. Seven of the 32 domestic serious domestic violence cases for the month of September 1998 were violation of restraining order cases.

[xxviii] Of the total of 374 criminal domestic violence cases in Arapahoe County between Jan. 1, 1998 and August 31, 1998, 91 of the defendants were female. Of those 81 were “codefendants.” That is, the officer(s) at the scene determined that both parties had committed a crime and that the label, “domestic violence” attached. In the remaining 10, the female was determined to be the perpetrator. Fax transmittal from Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office dated Sept. 4, 1998.

[xxix] Colorado State Archives, House and Senate Summary Sheets. For example Dr. Walker testified for HB 1126 on Jan. 28, 1994.

[xxx] See note 2 of “What Family Law Practitioners Should Know About Domestic Violence”, by Norman J. Brisson The Colorado Lawyer, page 52, January 1990.

[xxxi] Dr. Walker admits as much in the introduction of her book: “I am aware that this book is written from a feminist vision. It is a picture of what happens in a domestic violent act from the perspective of only one of the two parties. The mend do not have equal rebuttal time” (introduction, p. xvii The Battered Woman, Harper Colophon Books, 1979).

[xxxii] “The New Mythology,” by Christina Hoff Sommers, June 27, 1994, The National Review.

[xxxiii] “When he (Ringle) asked Janet Katz--professor of sociology and criminal justice at Old Dominion, and one of the principal authors of the study cited by Miss Kuehl--about the connection between violence and football games, she said: ‘That’s not what we found at all.’ Instead, she told him, they had found that an increase in emergency-room admission ‘was not associated with the occurrence of football games in general.’” Ibid.

[xxxiv] The Battered Woman, Lenore E. Walker, 1979, Harper & Row, page 10.

[xxxv] Who Stole Feminism-How Women Betrayed Women, Christina Hoff Sommers, 1994, Simon and Schuster.

[xxxvi] “1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic Violence Protective Orders”, by Melody K. Fuller and Janet L. Stansberry, The Colorado Lawyer, October 1994/Vol 23, No. 10, page 2327.

[xxxvii] August 27, 1997 release from The Women’s Freedom Network, Prof. Rita Simon, citing Special Crime data brief, 1995 release, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

[xxxviii] The Battered Woman, supra note 34: “Most battered women are from middle-class and higher-income homes where the power of their wealth is in the hands of their husbands.” (page 15); “American Society reinforces marriage. Despite the fact that married women are more often depressed and mentally unhealthy than single women, they are encourage to stay married for economic reasons even when they are battered. And they do stay married.” (page 114); “In analyzing the kinds of dissonance that occurred within the families of these battering couples, it is important to identify the battered woman and her batterer as the core of the nuclear family. (emphasis added, page 132); “In a small number of case, it is the woman who commits violence. I would imagine, however, as I have stated elsewhere, that in most of these cases the woman’s violence is probably retaliatory in nature. This means, then, that our dream of the happy family is inconsistent with the reality that family living actually provides.” (emphasis added, page 222).

[xxxix] Fatherless America, Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem, by David Blankenhorn, 1994, Basic Books, page 35. See generally pages 32-39, 141-43; 287 n.45.

[xl] See In the Interest of Destinee Chiara Sawyer, Case # 96 JV 461, Arapahoe District Court.

[xli]Walker’s Orwellian use of the word “battering” is based on “an expanded definition of battering behavior as both physical and psychological.” The Battered Woman, page xv.

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